Reforming WTO Discipline on Export Duties: Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Economic Development and Environmental Protection by Qin, Julia Ya
Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School
1-1-2012
Reforming WTO Discipline on Export Duties:
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Economic
Development and Environmental Protection
Julia Ya Qin
Wayne State University, ya.qin@wayne.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Julia Ya Qin, Reforming WTO Discipline on Export Duties: Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Economic Development and Environmental
Protection, 46 J. World Trade 1147 (2012).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/116
Reforming WTO Discipline on Export
Duties: Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
Economic Development and Environmental
Protection
Julia YA QIN*
The current World Trade Organization (WTO) regime on export restraints comprises two
extremes: at one end is the near-complete freedom to levy export duties enjoyed by most
Members, which renders theWTO discipline on export restrictions largely ineffective; at the other
end, the rigid obligations imposed on several acceding Members prohibiting the use of export
duties for any purpose.The recentWTO ruling in China-Raw Materials has only solidified the
latter extreme.This article seeks to expose the irrationality of the current regime, especially the
problems created by the rigid obligations of the several acceding Members. It contends that such
obligations deprive these Members of their ownership right to claim a larger share of their natural
resources for domestic use and of an effective tool for managing environmental externalities
associated with the resource products exported.The virtual immutability of such obligations is at
odds with the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.To rectify these problems,
this article proposes integrating all stand-alone export concessions into General Agreement on
Tariffs andTrade (GATT) schedules, which would provide the acceding Members with the policy
space and flexibility available under the GATT. It is also submitted that the key to gaining
support from developing countries for the establishment of a system-wide discipline lies in the
recognition of legitimate functions of export duties. Rather than pushing for their elimination, the
WTO should aim to regulate export duties in the same manner as its regulation of import
duties.
1 INTRODUCTION
The recent WTO dispute in China-Raw Materials1 has exposed a highly irrational
aspect of the world trade system. On the one hand, theWTO Agreement does not
require its Members to limit the use of export duties, which renders its general
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The main thesis of this article was first presented at the Eleventh Annual WTO Conference, held
at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law on May 25, 2011. I wish to thank
the participants of the Conference for their comments, and Erica Beecher-Monas, Milan
Hejtmanek and Ruosi Zhang, for their valuable input.
1 Appellate Body Reports, China–Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
WT/DS394, 395, 398/AB/R, 30 January 2012 (Appellate Body Reports); Panel Reports,
WT/DS394, 395, 398/R, 5 July 2011 (Panel Reports).
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discipline on export restrictions ineffective. On the other hand, China and a few
other Members – all of which are developing countries – are bound by the
strictest obligations on export duties. Included as part of the terms of their
accession to the WTO, these obligations are considered permanent, not amenable
to change, and according to the rulings in China-Raw Materials, not entitled to any
public policy exception if they do not explicitly refer to such exceptions contained
in the GATT, the mainWTO agreement regulating import and export tariffs.
The result is a highly imbalanced and inequitable state of affairs, especially
insofar as trade in natural resources is concerned.At the one extreme, the absence
of an effectiveWTO discipline on export restrictions leaves many economies, both
developed and developing, vulnerable to shortage and price fluctuations in the
supply of raw materials. In an era of globalized supply chains, the lack of security
and stability in access to raw materials poses serious risks to numerous industries
and businesses. At the other extreme, the ‘ironclad’ discipline imposed on the
selected acceding Members takes away the right of these countries to use export
duties as a legitimate tool for economic development, for they are not allowed to
keep a greater share of their natural resources for domestic use and instead must
sell their resource-based products to all domestic and foreign purchasers on an
equal basis. Furthermore, should these countries fail to implement proper
environmental standards in the production process, resulting in artificially low
prices of raw materials, they may not use export taxes to address the negative
environmental externality. If these countries choose to ‘subsidize’ domestic
industries with cheap raw materials, they are required byWTO law to do the same
for competing foreign industries, even though they must ultimately bear the
consequences of environmental degradation at home.
It should be obvious that such a state of affairs is undesirable and indefensible
as a matter of principle for theWTO system, whose objectives include substantial
reduction of tariffs, elimination of discriminatory treatment and achieving the
optimal use of the world’s resources and sustainable development through
protecting and preserving the environment in a manner consistent with the
respective needs and concerns of its Members at different levels of economic
development.2 The systemic issues underlying the WTO regime on export
restrictions, however, did not attract much attention until more recently when
global demand soared for natural resources and resource-based products.3 The
2 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter the WTO
Agreement], Preamble.
3 See World Trade Organization,World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources (hereinafter,
WTO Report on Resource Trade), available at www.wto.org. The report is the most
comprehensive study on the subject to date.
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China-Raw Materials case and the subsequent disputes over China’s export
restrictions on rare earths4 have pushed these issues to the forefront of WTO
studies.5
This article seeks to accomplish two things: first, exposing the irrationality of
the current WTO regime on export restrictions, especially the legal problems
stemming from the ironclad rules imposed on the few acceding Members; second,
proposing that all export duty obligations under the WTO be brought into the
GATT framework as the first step towards rationalizing the regime.The rest of the
article will proceed as follows. Section 2 explains the current WTO regime on
export restraints and how it has resulted in four tiers of Members in terms of their
rights and obligations. Section 3 examines the functions of export duties and the
implications of the current regime for sovereignty over natural resources,
economic development and environmental protection. Section 4 sets forth
concrete proposals to rationalize the regime. Section 5 concludes.
2 THE IRRATIONALWTO REGIME ON EXPORT RESTRAINTS
2.1 CURIOUS ABSENCE OF GATT DISCIPLINE ON EXPORT TARIFFS
Import and export restrictions are both barriers to trade. Hence, the world trade
system set out to regulate both of them.The general scheme of the GATT is to
eliminate all forms of import and export restrictions other than duties, taxes
and other charges (Article XI), and to conduct tariff negotiations to reduce the
general level of tariffs on both imports and exports by creating tariff bindings
(Article XXVIIIbis). In other words, GATT chose tariffs over quantitative
restrictions as the lawful means of restricting imports and exports, and called for
future negotiations to gradually reduce the level of both import and export tariffs.
In addition, all import and export tariffs and charges must be applied on a
non-discriminatory basis (Article I) and administered in a transparent and
reasonable manner (Article X).
4 On 13 March 2012, the US, the EU and Japan launched formal WTO disputes over China’s
export restrictions on rare earths. China–Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,Tungsten and
Molybdenum (China–Rare Earths), DS431(US), DS432 (EU), DS433 (Japan), at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/dsrfc_13mar12_e.htm.
5 Recent studies include the following: Baris Karapinar, Export Restrictions and the WTO Law: How to
Reform the ‘Regulatory Deficiency’, 45 J.World Trade 1139 (2011); Mitsuo Matsushita, Export Control of
Natural Resources:WTO Panel Ruling on the Chinese Export Restrictions of Natural Resources, 3 Trade, L. &
Dev. 267 (2011); Bin Gu, Mineral Export Restraints and Sustainable Development – Are Rare Earths Testing
theWTO’s Loopholes? 14 J. Int’l Econ. L. 765 (2011).
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The parallel between GATT regulations of import and export restrictions,
however, does not go much further.6 While GATT contains a detailed framework
for binding import tariffs and protecting the bindings from erosion, it sets out no
specific obligation to bind export tariffs. In the ensuing decades, the world trading
system has successfully concluded eight rounds of negotiations, leading to
substantial reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports.Yet, no similar
negotiation has ever been conducted to reduce export tariffs and barriers. Other
than the few exceptions discussed below, WTO Members remain free to levy
duties on the export of any products. Because tariffs and quantitative restrictions
are functionally the same in their effects on trade, Members can easily resort to
tariffs to achieve the goal of export restriction. As a result, GATT Article XI
discipline on export restrictions has largely been rendered ineffective.7
This curious loophole in the system is attributable to a number of factors. On
the whole, the lack of focus on export restrictions reflects the mercantilist
assumption among trading nations that exports are more desirable than imports.8
The result is a system that is preoccupied with the access to markets (import
restrictions), rather than the access to supply (export restrictions).9 Historically,
access to raw materials and other natural-resource-based products did not pose a
major problem. Many resource-exporting countries were economies that lacked
industrial capacity and relied on selling primary commodities for income.10 The
main issues for them were unstable demand and price fluctuations in the
commodity markets and the need to diversify their economies away from primary
commodities.11 When export restrictions were occasionally discussed during the
GATT era, the contracting parties were unable to agree on how to approach the
6 Other GATT provisions concerning export restrictions include Articles VII (customs valuation),
VIII (fees and formalities), XIII (nondiscriminatory administration of quotas), XIV (exception to
Article XIII), XVII (state trading), XX (general exceptions), XXI (security exceptions) and
XXVIII (modification of schedules).
7 An export duty set at a prohibitively high level would have the same effect as an export ban,
hence might be challenged as such under GATT Article XI.
8 Claude Barfield, Trade and Raw Materials—Looking Ahead, presentation at the Conference on the EU’s
Trade Policy and Raw Materials Brussels (Sept. 29, 2008).
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140919.pdf.
9 For a detailed discussion, see Melaku Geboye Desta, The Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, theWorldTrade Organization, and RegionalTrade Agreements, 37 J.WorldTrade 523-551 (2003).
10 Hence, historically the major industrial countries ‘could reasonably assume that no impediment
would ever be placed to their free access to other people’s resources’. Statement of the
Representative of Canada on Feb. 22, 1977, GATT Doc. MTN/FR/W/6 (Mar. 10, 1977), 1.
Credit is due to Lorand Bartels for pointing to this source.
11 These issues were fully recognized at the inception of the GATT. See Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization, UN Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948), Chapter VI. Inter-Governmental
Commodity Agreements, Article 55 Difficulties relating to Primary Commodities. See also GATT
Article XXIX (relation to the Havana Charter).
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issue.12 Some more advanced resource-exporting economies wanted to link
negotiations over export restrictions to those over import restrictions affecting
resource-based industrial products.13 Others, representing the perspective of less
developed economies, insisted that two of the guiding principles in reassessing the
GATT export disciplines would be ‘the sovereignty of States over their natural
resources’ and ‘the need for developing countries to utilize their resources for their
development in the most optimal manner as considered appropriate by them’.14
In more recent years, the global demand for resource products has outpaced
supply, thanks in no small part to the rapid industrialization of developing
economies, especially large countries such as China and India.15 The rising
demand in a world of finite supplies has caused widespread anxiety over the
security in access to natural resources. Against this backdrop, the world has seen
increasing uses of export restraints on resource products, mainly by developing
countries.16 In response, the European Union (EU), the US and several other
WTO Members have circulated various proposals calling for reform ofWTO rules
on export restrictions.17 Yet, such proposals have received a ‘cool response’ from
developing country members.18 With the collapse of the Doha Round, the
prospect for negotiating a new multilateral discipline on trade in natural resources
remains dim.
2.2 EXPORT DUTY COMMITMENTS UNDER THE WTO AGREEMENT
The lack of an effective GATT discipline on export restraints notwithstanding, a
small number ofWTO Members have made commitments on export duties.They
fall under two categories: (1) commitments made under the GATT; and (2)
commitments under theWTO accession protocols.
12 The issue of export restrictions was discussed in both the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round
with no result. See GATT Document, Export Restrictions and Charges, Background Note by the
Secretariat, MTN/GNG/NG2/W/40 (Aug. 8, 1989).
13 GATT, Communication from Delegation of Canada, MTN/FR/W/21 (Mar. 30, 1979); Statement
by the Delegation of Australia, MTN/FR/W/22 (Apr. 6, 1979).
14 GATT, Statement by the Delegation of India, MTN/FR/W/23 (Apr. 6, 1979).
15 For trends in natural resource trade, see WTO Report on Resource Trade, supra n. 3, at 54-59.
Despite growing demand from China and India, developed countries remain the leading importers of
natural resources.As of 2008, the largest resource importers were the US (15.2%), Japan (9.1%), China
(8.6%), Germany (6%), South Korea (4.7%), France (3.9%) and India (3.5%). Id. at 59.
16 See WTO Report on Resource Trade, supra n. 3, at 116-119.
17 E.g., Communication from the European Communities, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products:
Revised Submission on Export Taxes, TN/MA/W/101 (Jan. 17, 2008); Communication from Chile;
Costa Rica; Japan; Republic of Korea; the Separate CustomsTerritory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu; Ukraine and the US, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products: Enhanced Transparency in Export
Licensing,TN/MA/W/15/Add.4/Rev.7 (Nov. 23, 2010). See Karapinar, supra n. 5, at 1149-50.
18 Karapinar, id. at 1150.
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2.2[a] Export Duty Commitments under the GATT
Despite the lack of a detailed framework for binding export duties, there were at
least two known cases of export duty concessions in GATT history.The first was a
concession on export duties on tin ore and tin concentrates, made in the early
years of the GATT by the United Kingdom in respect of the Malayan Union.19
The second is the concession made by Australia in the Uruguay Round in 1994.
In exchange for certain import commitments from the European Communities,
Australia agreed not to impose any export duty on certain iron ore, titanium ore,
zirconium ore, coal, peat, coke, refined copper, unwrought nickel, nickel oxide, and
lead waste and scrap.20 In both cases, the concessions were set out in the tariff
schedules annexed to the GATT.
2.2[b] Export-Duty Commitments under Accession Protocols
After the establishment of the WTO, a number of acceding countries have been
asked to undertake special commitments on export duties as part of the terms of
their accession. Of the twenty-nine countries that have acceded to the WTO (or
have completed their accession negotiations) thus far, nine have been required to
do so. They are the following: Mongolia (1997), Latvia (1999), Croatia (2000),
China (2001), Saudi Arabia (2005),Vietnam (2007), Ukraine (2008), Montenegro
(2012) and Russia (2012).21
The scope and nature of the accession commitments on export duties vary
widely.22 At one end of the spectrum is Croatia, which merely promised to ‘apply
export duties only in accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreement’.23
19 GATT Analytical Index, Art. II, 73-74 (citing the United Kingdom Schedule XIX, Section D
(Malayan Union) to the effect that ‘The products comprised in the above item shall be assessed
for duty on the basis of their tin content; the rate to be levied on such tin content being the
same as the rate chargeable on smelted tin, Provided that the rate of duty on this item may exceed
the rate chargeable on smelted tin in the event that and so long as the United States of America
subsidised directly or indirectly the smelting of tin in the United States’).
20 Australia’s Uruguay Round Goods Schedules, AUS1-201 through AUS1-204, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/australia_e.htm. Products subject to the export
duty concessions are indicated with note (1), which states as follows: ‘There shall be no export
duty on this product. (EC).’ The concessions were evidently made to the EC. By virtue of the
most-favoured-nation clause, they apply to all other WTO Members as well. Special thanks to
Amy Porges for identifying this information.
21 At the time of this writing, the accessions of Montenegro and Russia have been approved by the
WTO. They are expected to become WTO Members during 2012, after the completion of
relevant domestic ratification processes.
22 The accession packages of the acceding countries are available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm.
23 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Croatia to the World Trade Organization,
WT/ACC/HRV/59 (June 29, 2000), para. 101. Croatia confirmed that it did not impose any
export duty at the time, but its government retained the authority to impose export duties ‘in
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Since the WTO Agreement does not contain any provision to limit the use of
export duties, this commitment amounts to nothing substantive. At the other end
is Montenegro, which has promised not to apply or reintroduce any export
duties.24 Close to this end is China, which made a sweeping commitment to
‘eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports’ except for eighty-four products
and to bind the export duties on all eighty-four products at specific rates.25 In a
similar vein, Latvia undertook to abolish all export duties on products listed in its
accession protocol (which are certain wood products, metal scraps and antiques)
except for specific antiques.26 The other countries agreed to eliminate or reduce
export duties on specific products only.Thus,Mongolia agreed to eliminate, within
ten years of its accession, export duties on raw cashmere.27 Saudi Arabia
undertook not to impose any export duty on iron and steel scrap.28 Vietnam
promised to gradually reduce the rates of export duties on a number of ferrous and
non-ferrous scrap metals.29 And Ukraine committed to reduce and bind the rates
of export duties in accordance with a detailed schedule on a variety of oil seeds,
live cattle and hides, and ferrous and non-ferrous scraps.30 The most extensive
product-specific commitments have been made by Russia, which has agreed to
bind export duties on more than 700 tariff lines.31
The commitments of the acceding countries are set out in their respective
protocols of accession. Pursuant to Article XII of theWTO Agreement, a country
may accede to the WTO Agreement ‘on terms to be agreed between it and the
WTO’. Because the acceding Member will benefit from the access to the markets
of other WTO Members that were liberalized through previous negotiation
rounds, it is expected to reciprocate by opening up its own market.Thus, the terms
exceptional cases for the protection of exhaustible natural resources, or to ensure essential materials
to the domestic industry and to prevent shortages in domestic supply.’ Id. at para. 100. Paragraph
100, however, is not legally binding as it was not incorporated into the accession protocol of Croatia.
See id. at para. 225.
24 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization,
WT/ACC/CGR/38 (Dec. 5, 2011), para. 132.
25 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001), para.
11.3; Annex 6.
26 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Latvia to the World Trade Organization,
WT/ACC/LVA/32 (Sept. 30, 1998), para. 69; Annex 3.
27 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Mongolia, WT/ACC/MGN/9 (June 27, 1996),
para. 24.
28 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the World
Trade Organization,WT/ACC/SAU/61 (Nov. 1, 2005), para. 184.
29 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam,WT/ACC/VNM/48 (Oct. 27, 2006),
para. 260 and Table 17. Vietnam provided a list of 43 products subject to export duties but stated
that it did not consider the imposition of export duties as inconsistent with WTO rules. Id. at
para. 257 andTable 16.
30 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine to the World Trade Organization,
WT/ACC/UKR/152 (Jan. 25, 2008), para. 240, and Table 20(b).
31 See infra text at n. 58.
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to be negotiated in accession focus heavily on market access, that is, reduction in
tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports, in the acceding country. However, since
Article XII does not place any limit on the ‘terms’ to be negotiated, theWTO has
developed a practice of demanding concessions from the acceding country that go
well beyond market access. The result is a whole slew of Member-specific
obligations, ranging from those which are commercial in nature, such as export
duty commitments, to those that would require systemic reforms at home.32 These
obligations are known as ‘WTO-plus’, for they exceed the requirements of the
multilateral WTO agreements. The country subject to the largest number of
WTO-plus obligations is China.33
The Member-specific obligations of the acceding Members are enforceable
underWTO law, as each of the protocols of accession declares itself as ‘an integral
part’ of the WTO Agreement, which is a ‘covered agreement’ for the purpose of
WTO dispute settlement.34 Apart from enforceability, however, it remains unclear
how exactly the Member-specific obligations are ‘integrated’ into the WTO
Agreement.
2.2[c] Legal Issues Raised by the Stand-Alone Export Duty Commitments
The export duty commitments undertaken in the accession protocols raise at least
two major issues inWTO law: (a) whether these commitments are entitled to the
general exceptions available under the GATT; and (b) whether these commitments
can ever be modified or withdrawn.
2.2[c][i] Availability of GATT Exceptions to Export Duty Commitments
Whether a Member-specific commitment under the accession protocol is entitled
to the policy exceptions provided for in the relevant WTO agreements, such as
GATT Articles XX (general exceptions) and XXI (security exceptions), raises a
systemic question on the relationship between different legal instruments within
the framework of theWTO Agreement.35 Insofar as China’s accession protocol is
32 For a general survey and analysis of such obligations within the WTO system, see Steve
Charnovitz, Mapping the Law of WTO Accession, in Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson & Alan
Yanovich (eds.), The WTO: Governance, Dispute Settlement & Developing Countries ch. 46 (Juris
Publishing 2008).
33 See generally Julia Ya Qin, ‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for the WTO Legal System –
An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 J.WorldTrade 483 (2003).
34 See e.g., China’s Accession Protocol, para. 1.2.
35 For historical reasons, the WTO treaty structure is exceedingly complex and the relationship
between provisions of different WTO agreements is not always explained in the treaty language. It
remains unclear, for example, whether the GATT general exceptions should apply to the various
other WTO agreements on trade in goods, such as the agreements on anti-dumping measures and
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concerned, the Appellate Body has taken a strict textualist approach, according to
which the applicability of GATT general exceptions to a particular accession
commitment hinges on whether there is an explicit textual link between them.
Thus, in China–Publications, the Appellate Body held that China may invoke
GATT Article XX to defend the violation of its trading-rights commitments set
out in paragraph 5.1 of China’s accession protocol, because the introductory
phrase of paragraph 5.1 provides such a textual link (stating that the trading-rights
commitments are ‘without prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade in a manner
consistent with theWTO Agreement’).36 By contrast, in China-Raw Materials, the
Appellate Body rejected the applicability of GATT Article XX to China’s export
duty commitments, because it could not find a similar textual link in paragraph
11.3 of its accession protocol.37 ‘In the light of China’s explicit commitment
contained in paragraph 11.3 to eliminate export duties and the lack of any textual
reference to Article XX of the GATT 1994 in that provision’, the Appellate Body
concludes,‘we see no basis to find that Article XX of the GATT 1994 is applicable
to export duties found to be inconsistent with paragraph 11.3’.38
The Appellate Body’s ruling has serious implications not only for China, but
also for other acceding Members that have undertaken export duty commitments.
Of these Members, Mongolia, Latvia, Saudi Arabia and Montenegro all undertook
to eliminate export duties on all or specific products, but none of them included
in their commitments an express reference to the GATT exceptions. As a result,
none of these countries will be entitled to invoke the policy exceptions of GATT
Articles XX and XXI to justify a departure from such commitments. By contrast,
Vietnam, Ukraine and Russia did include an express reference to GATT in the
text of their respective export duty commitments.39 Rather than eliminating
export duties, these three countries agreed to bind export duties on specific
subsidies. When this question arose in disputes, the Appellate Body avoided answering it directly.
See Appellate Body Reports, United States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand (DS343), United
States – Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to Antidumping/Countervailing Duties (DS345),
WT/DS343/AB/R,WT/DS345/AB/R, adopted 1 August 2008, paras. 304-319.
36 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (21 December 2009), paras.
229-233.
37 Appellate Body Reports, para. 291. It also attaches significance to the fact that para. 11.3 expressly
refers to GATT Art.VIII but not other GATT provisions. Id. at para. 303.
38 Id. at para. 306.
39 Vietnam’s commitment provides that ‘Viet Nam would apply export duties, export fees and
charges, as well as internal regulations and taxes applied on or in connection with exportation in
conformity with the GATT 1994.’ Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam,
supra n. 29, para. 260. Ukraine’s accession protocol states that with respect to the products subject to
the export duty commitments, ‘Ukraine would not increase export duties, nor apply other measures
having an equivalent effect, unless justified under the exceptions of the GATT 1994.’ Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine, supra n. 30, para. 240. For the Russia case, see Section
2.2[d].
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products only.40 It is also worth noting that all three countries have concluded
their accession packages after the issue of legal justification arose with respect to
China’s export duty commitments.41
The strict textualist approach taken by the Appellate Body, regrettably, has led
to an irrational and undesirable result in theWTO system.The general exceptions
of GATT Articles XX and XXI are designed to safeguard important public
policies and non-trade values from being infringed by the obligations to liberalize
trade.They apply to all GATT obligations, ranging from tariff concessions to the
elimination of all quantitative restrictions and the fundamental principles of
most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment. By holding the
export duty commitments immune from the GATT policy exceptions, the
Appellate Body has effectively turned these trade-liberalization commitments into
more ‘sacred’ obligations than the most fundamental principles of theWTO. From
a policy standpoint, the Appellate Body’s ruling sends a powerful message: without
an express textual reference, individual trade-liberalization obligations will be
interpreted to trump public policy and non-trade values underWTO law.
The Appellate Body’s decision indicates that it views each accession protocol
as a self-contained agreement, independent from the rest of theWTO Agreement,
and that the relationship between a specific accession commitment and another
WTO agreement can only be established through an express reference in the text
of that specific accession commitment.This view, however, is highly problematic.42
Unlike other legal instruments annexed to the WTO Agreement,WTO accession
protocols are not devoted to a single subject matter, such as trade in goods,
services, investment measures or intellectual property rights. Instead, the accession
protocol sets out the terms of accession for a country that cover subjects across the
entire spectrum of the WTO Agreement. As a result, the special commitments of
the acceding country cannot be understood independently of the general
disciplines set out in the multilateral WTO agreements. The export duty
commitments are such an example – they are inherently related to GATT
disciplines on customs tariffs and export restrictions. A sensible interpretive
40 See Appendix 1.
41 The EU, the US and Japan had raised the issue with China on the legal justification for its export
duties on raw materials long before the China-Raw Materials case was initiated. See e.g., WTO
Transitional Review Mechanism Pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Protocol on the Accession of the
People’s Republic of China, Questions from the European Communities to China, G/C/W/538 (Nov. 8,
2005); Questions from the United States to China, G/C/W/560 (Nov. 6, 2006); Questions from the
European Communities to China, G/C/W/568 (Nov. 17, 2006); Questions from Japan to China,
G/C/W/586 (Nov. 2, 2007). Hence, the issue had become known by the timeVietnam, Ukraine and
Russia finalized their accession packages in 2006, 2008 and 2011, respectively,
42 For a more detailed critique, see Julia Ya Qin, The Predicament of China’s ‘WTO-Plus’ Obligation to
Eliminate Export Duties: A Commentary on the China-Raw Materials Case, 11 Chinese J. Int’l Law 237
(2012).
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approach, therefore, should treat these GATT provisions, as well as the policy
exceptions available to them, as part of the relevant treaty context for the export
duty commitments.43
Key to the narrow textualist approach of theWTO judiciary is an assumption
that each term of the accession protocol was carefully negotiated and drafted, and
that any omission of an explicit reference to another WTO agreement was a
‘deliberate choice’ by the parties.44 Thus, the Appellate Body considered it
‘reasonable to assume that, had there been a common intention to provide access
to GATT Article XX in this respect, language to that effect would have been
included in paragraph 11.3 or elsewhere in China’s Accession Protocol’.45 This
‘reasonable’ assumption, however, disregards the political reality of accession
negotiations. Unlike WTO multilateral negotiations, in which diverse interests
among Members can be expected to provide the checks and balances necessary to
produce carefully drafted rules,WTO accession is a process in which the applicant
country must negotiate against the entire incumbent membership, through both
bilateral and multilateral procedures.46 In such a process, whether a particular term
was well negotiated and carefully drafted would depend not only on the
bargaining power of the applicant in specific negotiations, but also on the level of
legal sophistication and competence of its negotiation team and the quality of its
domestic decision-making process. Given the typical lack of experience on the
part of the acceding country, loosely drafted terms of accession are common.47
2.2[c][ii] Non-adjustability of Export Duty Commitments
Another major issue arising from the export duty commitments undertaken under
the accessions is the lack of flexibility of these commitments. None of the existing
WTO accession protocols mentions the possibility of amendment. Hence, whether
an accession protocol is amendable, and if so how it should be amended, remain
unclear as a matter of WTO law. One view holds that the terms of accession are
pre-conditions for the WTO membership of the acceding country and as such
cannot be renegotiated once the accession is completed.According to this view, all
43 For a systemic treatment of the topic, see Julia Ya Qin, The Challenge of Interpreting ‘WTO-Plus’
Provisions, 44 J.World Trade 127 (2010). For an excellent critique of the narrow textualist approach
adopted by the Appellate Body, see Henrik Horn & Joseph Weiler, European Communities–Trade
Description of Sardines:Textualism and Its Discontent, in H. Horn & P. Mavroidis (eds.), The WTO Case
Law of 2002, at 248 (Cambridge U. Press 2005).
44 Panel Reports, para. 7.129.
45 Appellate Body Reports, para. 293.
46 The problem of political imbalance in WTO accession negotiations is well known. See e.g., Kent
Jones, The Political Economy of WTO Accession: the Unfinished Business of Universal Membership. 8 World
Trade Rev. 279-314 (2009).
47 See Qin, supra n. 33, at 515-16, for examples in China’s accession protocol.
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accession terms are permanent and immutable, except for the market access
commitments incorporated into the schedules of GATT and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which can be adjusted according to the
GATT and GATS procedures respectively.The only way the acceding country can
escape the terms of its accession is to withdraw from theWTO altogether.
An alternative view sees the terms of accession as supplemental to the
multilateral WTO agreements, and as such superseding inconsistent WTO
provisions when applied to the acceding country. In accordance with this view, the
Member-specific commitments contained in the accession protocol are integrated
organically into the WTO rule system and can be amended in the same way as
other provisions of the WTO Agreement. Given the extreme difficulty in
amending a WTO provision,48 however, revising the terms of accession is
practically impossible. In theory, theWTO can also adopt a separate procedure for
the amendment of accession protocols,49 but in practice it is doubtful that any
acceding country would be willing and able to engage the WTO membership in
the negotiation of this issue.As a result, the terms of accession are fixed without a
realistic chance for revision.
In the context of the export duty commitments, this inflexibility contrasts
sharply with the ample opportunities for adjustment of import duty concessions of
an acceding country. By virtue of being formally incorporated into the GATT, the
tariff bindings of the acceding Member can be renegotiated in accordance with a
number of GATT provisions, including Article XXVIII (modification of
schedules), Article XVIII:7 (promoting infant industries by developing countries),
Article XXIV:6 (formation of a customs union) and Article II:6 (adjustment of
specific duties due to currency revaluation). The principal provision for tariff
renegotiation is Article XXVIII. Under this provision, a WTO Member may
modify or withdraw a concession included in its GATT schedule by entering into
agreement with Members with which the concession ‘was initially negotiated’ and
other Members which have ‘a principal supplying interest’, subject to consultation
with any other Member determined by theWTO to have ‘a substantial interest’ in
48 Pursuant to Art. X of the WTO Agreement, any amendment that would alter the rights and
obligations of the Members shall take effect upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members.
Because ‘acceptance’ means that the Members must comply with their respective domestic legal
procedures for approval of a treaty amendment, which for some Members would require
ratification by legislature, amendment to a WTO provision is extremely difficult. To date, the only
formal amendment to an annex of the WTO Agreement that has been adopted by the General
Council is the 2005 amendment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). Amendment of TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005). This
amendment has not yet taken effect because it has not received acceptance by two thirds of the
Members.
49 See Qin, supra n. 43, at 134-35.
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the concession.50 Such modification or withdrawal can be done every three years
(‘open season’ renegotiation).51 The Member seeking modification is expected to
offer compensatory adjustment so as to maintain a general level of reciprocal
concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for prior to the
renegotiation. However, if no agreement can be reached, the Member is
nonetheless free to modify or withdraw the concession, in which case other
interested Members will be free to withdraw substantially equivalent
concessions.52 In addition to the open season, theWTO may, at any time in special
circumstances, authorize a Member to enter into negotiations for modification or
withdrawal of a scheduled concession, subject to specific procedures and
conditions.53 All modifications and withdrawals shall be applied on a MFN basis to
all Members of theWTO.
The right of a Member to modify or withdraw a concession is absolute, in
that it is not dependent on an agreement being reached with other Members.54 In
practice, dozens of Members, including all major trading nations, have invoked the
right to modify their concessions under Article XXVIII.55 Tariff concessions are
modified or withdrawn under Article XXVIII generally to afford additional
protection to industry or agriculture.56 A similar right is provided for the
modification and withdrawal of services concessions under the GATS.57
The flexibility built into the GATT and GATS schedules is ultimately
beneficial for trade liberalization. Knowing that a concession may be withdrawn if
necessary, WTO Members are more inclined to make new concessions. This
50 GATT Art. XXVIII:1 and Ad Article XXVIII.
51 The first three-year period began on 1 Jan. 1958 and the latest one on 1 Jan. 2012. Pursuant to
Article XXVIII:5, a Member may, by advance notice to the WTO, reserve the right to renegotiate
its concessions throughout the duration of the next three-year period.
52 GATT Art. XXVIII:3.
53 GATT Art. XXVIII:4. In GATT practice, approval of request for authorization under Art.
XXVIII:4 had become a routine matter. Anwarul Hoda, Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations under
the GATT and theWTO, Procedures and Practices 88 (Cambridge U. Press 2001).
54 Hoda, id. at 16. Although, in such cases, other Members may retaliate by withdrawing substantially
equivalent concessions, such retaliation has been rare in practice.The rare use can be ascribed to the
fact that renegotiations were generally successful and that the retaliatory withdrawals must be made on
an MFN basis. See Hoda, id. at 95-97.
55 During the GATT era (until 30 March 1994), more than 40 Members made a total of 270
requests to modify their concessions, and each such request may range from one tariff item to an
entire schedule. See GATT Analytical Index, Art. XXVIII, Tables. Since the establishment of the
WTO in 1995, there have been 34 requests to enter into renegotiations under GATT Art.
XXVIII. See WTO: Goods Schedules–Current Situation of Schedules, at www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_table_e.htm.
56 Hoda, supra n. 53, at 91, 107. Other common reasons were rationalization or simplification of tariffs,
introduction of new tariff nomenclature and conversion from specific to ad valorem tariffs.
57 GATS Art. XXI (Modification of Schedules).
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rational aspect of the system, however, is completely lost in the case of the
stand-alone export duty commitments under the accession protocols.
2.2[d] The Russia Model
The Russian accession has broken new ground in the legal treatment of export
duty commitments. Unlike other acceding countries, Russia has successfully
negotiated its export duty commitments within the GATT framework, thus
avoiding the issues arising from the stand-alone commitments discussed above.
Specifically, Russia has created a new ‘Part V–Export Duties’ in its GATT
Schedule,58 detailing products of more than 700 tariff lines that are subject to the
maximum rate of export duties ranging from 0% to 50% or to specific duties
determined by complex formulae. According to the Working Party Report on
Russia’s accession, Russia will implement, from the date of accession, its tariff
concessions and commitments contained in Part V of its schedule, ‘subject to the
terms, conditions or qualifications’ set forth therein.59 Part V of the Russia
Schedule begins with this statement:
The Russian Federation undertakes not to increase export duties, or to reduce or to
eliminate them, in accordance with the following schedule, and not to reintroduce or
increase them beyond the levels indicated in this schedule, except in accordance with the
provisions with GATT 1994. (emphasis added)
Thus, Russia has explicitly reserved the right to do the following: (i) invoke all
applicable GATT exceptions with respect to its export duty concessions, and (ii)
amend PartV of its schedule in accordance with applicable GATT provisions.
A question remains as to whether Article XXVIII, the principal GATT
provision on the modification of schedules,60 applies to Part V of the Russia
Schedule. Article XXVIII clearly contemplates modification of import
concessions, as it refers to the Members with ‘a principal supplying interest’ in a
concession (along with the Members with which a concession was ‘initially
negotiated’ and those ‘with a substantial interest’ in the concession).61 It is
noteworthy that Part V of the Russia Schedule does not include a column
indicating which Members will have ‘initial negotiating rights’ (INR) in the event
of renegotiation of a specific concession according to Article XXVIII.62 However,
58 GATT Schedule CLXV – The Russian Federation (the Russia Schedule).
59 The Report of Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade
Organization,WT/ACC/RUS/70 (Nov. 17, 2011), para. 638.
60 Supra text at nn. 51-53.
61 Supra text at n. 50.
62 A column of INR is included in the part for import tariff concessions of the Russia Schedule.
See the Russia Schedule, Part I.
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INR is not indicated in all import concessions,63 and the absence of INR does
not affect the absolute right of a Member to modify or withdraw its concessions
under Article XXVIII.64 The said Article, which is titled ‘Modification of
Schedules’, applies to ‘a concession’ that is ‘included in the appropriate Schedule
annexed to this [GATT] Agreement’.65 Part V of the Russia Schedule clearly falls
within this definition. Other than the references to ‘a principal supplying interest’,
the mechanism set out in Article XXVIII can be used for both import and export
concessions.66 The focus on the renegotiation of import concessions in this Article
is indicative of the historical fact that export concessions were not being
negotiated at the time; but it does not necessarily mean that the drafters intended
to exclude export concessions from the coverage of Article XXVIII.67 As noted
above, the GATT set out to regulate both import and export restrictions. And
Article XXVIIIbis (Tariff Negotiations) specifically recognizes the importance of
conducting negotiations ‘directed to the substantial reduction of the general level
of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports’.68 Thus, from a systemic
perspective, the principle and rationale underlying Article XXVIII should be
equally valid and applicable to export concessions. It remains to be seen, however,
whether this understanding will be contested.
2.3 THE FOUR TIERS OF WTO MEMBERS
As a result of the varying arrangements, there are now effectively four tiers of
WTO Members in terms of their rights and obligations concerning export
restraints. The first tier, which currently counts more than 140 Members, enjoys
nearly complete freedom to restrict exports, so long as the restriction is in the
form of export duty or taxes.69 The second tier, consisting of Australia and Russia,
has the obligation not to levy export duties on specific products in excess of those
set forth in their respective GATT schedules, but retains the full range of rights
under the GATT with respect to their commitments. The third tier comprises
63 See Hoda, supra n. 53, at 12-13.
64 Supra text at n. 54.
65 Article XXVIII:1.
66 In the context of export concessions, the equivalent to the concept of ‘a principal supplying
interest’ would be ‘a principal purchasing interest’.
67 A parallel argument was made by Matsushita with respect to the question of whether export duty
concessions are within the scope of GATT Art. II:1. See Matsushita, supra n. 5, at 274.
68 GATT Art. XXVIIIbis, para. 1.
69 A Member’s ability to apply export taxes may be subject to domestic constraints. The US, for
example, may not levy taxes on exports under its Constitution. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 5
(‘No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.’). The provision originated in
the concern of the southern states, whose economies relied heavily on exports, that the new
Federal government would be able to tax their exports in favour of the states that did not export.
For detailed treatment of the topic, see Eric Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 Fla.Tax Rev. 1 (2003).
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Ukraine andVietnam, which have the obligation to bind export tariffs under their
respective accession protocols, but may invoke GATT exceptions to justify a
breach of such obligation. The fourth tier consists of Mongolia, Latvia, China,
Saudi Arabia and Montenegro. These countries have the obligation to eliminate
the use of export tariffs under their respective accession protocols, but may not
invoke GATT exceptions to justify a departure from such obligation. Neither the
third-tier or fourth-tier Members have the right to modify or withdraw their
export duty concessions. The situation of the four tiers of WTO Members is
summarized in Appendix 1.
The four-tier membership creates unequal rights and obligations among
Members. While the scope of trade-liberalization commitments may vary from
country to country, the rights of WTO Members to invoke public policy
exceptions and modify their commitments according to certain procedures should
be kept uniform as a matter of principle. The current irrational state of affairs
results from the ad hoc rule-making in theWTO accession regime. It is regrettable
that the WTO judiciary is apparently unable and unwilling to mitigate the
situation.70
3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THEWTO EXPORT-DUTY REGIME
3.1 THE ROLE OF EXPORT DUTIES
From a historical perspective, countries have applied export duties for a variety of
reasons. Besides generating revenue for the government, export duties can be used
to smooth out the volatility of export earnings, soften the impact of rapidly rising
world prices in the domestic market, counter escalating tariffs in importing
countries and promote a fairer distribution of income by taxing the windfall gains
of exporters.71 In case a country controls a large share of the world supply of a
particular material, the levy of export duties can raise the price of the material in
international markets, thereby improving the terms of trade for the country.72
In addition, export duties may be used to pursue policy objectives that cannot
be pursued underWTO law by non-tariff means. In particular, the freedom to levy
export duties allows a country to promote domestic downstream industries and
70 See supra text at n. 43.
71 WTO Report on Resource Trade, supra n. 3, at 127.
72 The terms of trade refer to the relative price on world markets of a country’s exports as compared
to its imports. In the case of resource trade, a relatively small number of countries endowed with
scarce resources may be able to maximize their national economic welfare by limiting the supply
to the rest of the world. When this happens, the terms of trade and economic welfare of the
importing countries will worsen by the same amount. Hence, an export tax motivated by this
purpose is referred to as a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy. See WTO Report on Resource Trade,
supra n. 3, at 12.
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conserve exhaustible natural resources and protect the environment in a manner
inconsistent with the requirements of GATT Article XX.The legitimacy of these
functions is discussed below.
3.2 EXPORT DUTIES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Export duties tend to lower the domestic prices of raw materials and raise their
foreign prices. Hence, a country can use export duties to promote and protect its
domestic industries utilizing the raw materials. For developing countries, especially
those that are overly dependent on the export of primary commodities, promoting
domestic processing and downstream industries can be an effective way to diversify
their economies and to ‘climb up the value chain’. It is for this reason that many
developing countries regard export tariffs as a legitimate tool for economic
development.73
The legitimacy of export duties as a tool for economic development stems
ultimately from the principle of sovereignty over natural resources. Accordingly,
the discussion on export restraints and economic development ought to begin
with an exploration of this principle.
3.2[a] The Sovereign Right to Use Natural Resources for Economic Development
A nation’s right to use and exploit its natural resources for economic development
is implicit in its sovereignty over natural resources. As acknowledged by the Panel
in China-Raw Materials, state sovereignty over natural resources is a principle of
international law that allows states to ‘freely use and exploit their natural wealth
and resources wherever deemed desirable by them for their own progress and
economic development’.74
In exercising its sovereign right to natural resources, a nation may wish to
reserve a larger share of such resources for use by its domestic industries, rather
than sell them to foreign users. Because manufactured products are typically more
valuable than primary commodities, developing downstream industries can help an
economy move away from reliance on exports of resources and build up high
value-added sectors as its anchor. History has shown that export restraints on raw
materials are an effective means of promoting economic development. One of the
well-known historical examples is the export ban imposed by Henry VII on
English wool in the late fifteenth century, which induced a shift of wool textile
73 WTO Report on Resource Trade, supra n. 3, at 184.
74 Panel Reports, para. 7.380 (quoting UN General Assembly, Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and
Resources, 21 December 1952).
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production from Flanders and Burgundy to England, thus enabling the start of the
industrial revolution.75 Today, such a policy would be condemned for its
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ effect.There is, however, an important distinction between
import restrictions used to ‘beggar thy neighbours’ and export restraints on
resource materials: the latter is a policy designed to take advantage of one’s natural
endowment, in the exercise of one’s ownership rights.
The subject of sovereignty and trade is discussed extensively in legal
scholarship. Responding to new issues of globalization, recent studies tend to focus
on changes in the State’s power to control and regulate domestic activities affecting
trade.76 The topic of sovereignty over natural resources is rarely discussed in such a
context. It is notable that the WTO’s World Trade Report 2010 did cover the
topic, but dealt with it as an issue more relevant to foreign investment law than
WTO law.77 In China-Raw Materials, China argued that the GATT exception for
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources should be interpreted in a
manner that recognizes a Member’s sovereign rights over natural resources.78 That
argument, however, was dismissed by the Panel with a brief statement that
‘Members must exercise their sovereignty over natural resources consistently with
theirWTO obligations.’79 As a result, the broad implications of the sovereign right
over natural resources forWTO law have been left unaddressed.
The concept of ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’ evolved as a
new principle of international law in the post-war era within the United Nations
(UN).80 The claims were initially motivated by the efforts of newly independent
and other developing nations to secure the economic benefits arising from the
exploitation of natural resources within their territories. In the decolonization
period, the principle became associated with the right of colonial peoples to
self-determination and with human rights. The emphasis on the purpose of the
principle was subsequently placed on promoting national economic development.
The famed UN Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
75 ClydeV. Prestowitz, Export Restraints:The Key to Getting Rich, Foreign Policy Magazine (July 7, 2011).
Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective 19-21 (Anthem
Press 2002).
76 See e.g., John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law
(Cambridge U. Press 2006). For a collection of essays written by prominent authors, see Shan, Simon
& Singh (eds.),Redefining Sovereignty in International Economic Law (Hart Publishing 2008).
77 Supra n. 3, at 177-179 (noting that there is no provision in theWTO that speaks directly to the issues
of ownership of natural resources or the allocation of natural resources between states and foreign
investors).
78 Panel Reports, para. 7.364.
79 Id. at para. 7.381. The Panel also reasoned that the ability to enter into the WTO Agreement is a
‘quintessential example of the exercise of sovereignty’. Id. at para. 7.382.
80 For a comprehensive treatment, including the history of the principle, see Nico Schrijver,
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge U. Press 1997).
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declared as follows: ‘The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their
national development and of the well-being of the people of the State
concerned.’81
One distinct attribute of the sovereign right to natural resources is its status as
a basic human right under international law. According to the two Covenants on
Human Rights (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights): ‘All peoples
may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law.’82
‘Nothing’ in the two Covenants ‘shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent
right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and
resources’.83 Furthermore, the UN also recognizes ‘the right to development’ as ‘an
inalienable human right’ and that the realization of such right requires ‘the exercise
of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and
resources’.84 The notion that the sovereign right to natural resources belongs to
peoples – hence a human right – is an exceedingly powerful one. It suggests that
the State is merely the representative of its citizens in exercising this right and that
the State has the duty to exercise such right diligently and in the best interest of its
population.
Another distinct feature of the sovereignty over natural resources is its
‘permanency’.The permanent character implies that the right to dispose freely of
natural resources can always be regained, notwithstanding contractual obligations
to the contrary.85 A State can and should regain this right if, due to changed
circumstances, its contractual obligations have become so onerous that they were
manifestly against the interest of its people.86 As Abi-Saab, a former member of the
Appellate Body, once put it, ‘sovereignty is the rule and can be exercised at any
81 U.N. G.A. Res. 1803(XVII), ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1962).
82 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (16 Dec. 1966), Art. 1.2;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (16 Dec. 1966),
Art. 1.2.
83 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 47; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 25.
84 Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. G.A.Res. 41/28 (Dec. 4, 1986),Art. 1.
85 See Schrijver, supra n. 80, at 263.
86 Id. at 264 (concluding that ‘it is now commonly accepted that the principle of permanent sovereignty
precludes a State from derogating from the essence of the exercise of its sovereign rights over natural
resources’, but a State may by agreement freely entered into accept ‘a partial limitation on the exercise
of its sovereignty in respect of certain resources in particular areas for a specified and limited period of
time’).
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time’ and ‘limitations are the exceptions and cannot be permanent, but limited in
scope and time’.87
It is clear that the sovereign rights over natural resources are granted to
peoples on the basis of territorial sovereignty rather than a principle of sharing the
world’s resources.88 Since natural resources are unevenly distributed
geographically, the notion of permanent sovereignty solidifies the unequal
situations between nations that are rich in natural endowment and those that are
not.Although in modern international law the States also have a duty to cooperate
with each other and to promote international development, so far ‘it has proven to
be impossible to share the benefits of natural-resources exploitation on an
international basis’.89 Issues involving the exploitation and disposal of natural
resources tend to evoke strong emotions, especially in developing countries with
colonial pasts. People tend to instinctively view such issues as a matter of national
sovereignty and are particularly jealous of their rights as the owner of natural
wealth.
3.2[b] WTO Constraints on the Sovereign Right to Dispose Freely of Natural Resources
A nation’s claim to a larger share in the distribution of its natural resources,
however, is subject to the international obligations it voluntarily undertakes.90 By
entering into the WTO Agreement, a sovereign nation accepts the limitations
imposed by theWTO on the exercise of its right to the free disposal of its natural
resources. The most significant of such limitations is GATT Article XI:1, which
prohibits a Member from using any quantitative or other non-tariff means to
restrict exports.91 While this prohibition is subject to various exceptions, none of
them can be used for the purpose of promoting domestic industries.
To be specific, Articles XI:2(a) and (b) allow the imposition of export
restrictions ‘temporarily applied’ to relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other
essential products, or necessary to the application of standards or regulations for
the classification, grading or marketing of commodities.Articles XX(g), (h), (i) and
87 Id. at 263 (quoting Abi-Saab, Progressive Development of the Principles and Norms of International Law
Relating to the New International Economic Order, in U.N.Doc.A/39/504/Add.1, Oct. 23, 1984).
88 Id. at 386.
89 Id.
90 In a globalized economy, a state’s right to freely dispose of its natural resources is constrained by a
growing body of complex rules governing global economic relations. For specific constraints on
sovereign rights over natural resources, see Schrijver, supra n. 80, at 306-395.
91 The Article XI prohibition applies to a natural resource only to the extent that it may be traded.
It is generally accepted that WTO rules generally do not regulate natural resources before they are
extracted or harvested. Accordingly, restrictions on production of resources are not considered to
be inconsistent with Article XI. See WTO Report on Resource Trade, supra n. 3, at 162.
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(j) authorize the adoption of measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measure are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption’; or measures ‘undertaken in
pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agreement’; or
restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential
quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry ‘during periods
when the domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of
a government stabilization plan’, provided that ‘such restrictions shall not operate
to increase the exports of or the protection afforded to such domestic industry’; or
measures ‘essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local
short supply’, provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the
principle that all Members ‘are entitled to an equitable share of the international
supply of such products’. All the Article XX exceptions must also meet the
conditions of non-discrimination set out in its chapeau.
The understanding that none of the GATT exceptions is designed to promote
a domestic industry was explicitly confirmed from the early days of the trading
regime. A 1950 Report of the Working Party on ‘The Use of Quantitative
Restrictions for Protective and Other Commercial Purposes’ concluded as follows:
[The GATT] does not permit the imposition of restrictions upon the export of a raw
materials in order to protect or promote a domestic industry, whether by affording a price
advantage to that industry for the purchase of its materials, or by reducing the supply of
such materials available to foreign competitors, or by other means.92
There have been only a handful of disputes involving export restrictions in
the GATT/WTO history.93 As was typical, the defendant country was accused of
using export restrictions to protect its downstream producers at the expense of
their foreign competitors. For instance, in Canada-Salmon, the United States
claimed that Canada’s regulations prohibiting the export of unprocessed salmon
and herring were a clear violation of Article XI, designed to protect Canadian
processors and promote Canadian jobs at the expense of foreign processors.94
Canada defended its measure by invoking Article XI:2(b), which allows export
restrictions necessary to maintain product standards, and Article XX(g), which
excuses measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, but
failed on both counts.
The recent WTO ruling in China-Raw Materials also confirms that GATT
Article XX may not be used to justify a policy that is primarily aimed at domestic
92 GATT Analytical Index, Art. XX(i), 547.
93 See GATT Analytical Index, Art. XI, and WTO Analytical Index, GATT Art. XI.
94 See GATT Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon,
L/6268, adopted 22 March 1988, GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (BISD), 35S/98,
paras. 3.11, 3.29, 3.33.
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economic development. In this case, China openly admitted that its export
restraints are aimed at promoting domestic downstream industries, although its
main argument was that the development of downstream industries would help
improve the environment in the long run.95 China invoked Article XX(g) to
defend its position. In addressing China’s defence, the Panel referred to Article
XX(i) as an immediate context for Article XX(g), which allows restrictions on
exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure supply to a domestic processing
industry, but requires that the restrictions do not increase protection of such
domestic industry and do not depart from the principle of non-discrimination. In
the Panel’s view,Article XX(g) should not be interpreted to allow a Member to do
indirectly what Article XX(i) prohibits directly. In conclusion, ‘WTO Members
cannot rely on Article XX(g) to excuse export restrictions adopted in aid of
economic development if they operate to increase protection of the domestic
industry.’96
3.2[c] Tariffs Remain the Only Lawful Means of Restricting Exports for
Developmental Purpose
The world trade regime has long recognized the need for ‘positive efforts’ designed
to ensure that developing countries benefit from trade for their economic
development.97 To this end, GATT Article XVIII Government Assistance to Economic
Development allows a Member to deviate from certain GATT obligations in order
to promote infant industries.98 GATT Part IV Trade and Development specifically
recognizes the need for developing countries to diversify the structure of their
economies and avoid an excessive dependence on the export of primary
products.99 However, the provisions concerning infant industries focus on import
restrictions only.100 The efforts offered under GATT Part IV to accommodate the
need of developing countries to diversify their economies also
95 China argued that the imposition of export restrictions would allow China to develop its
economy in the future. ‘The reason for this is that export restraints encourage the domestic
consumption of these basic materials in the domestic economy. Consumption of the basic
materials at issue by downstream industries…, and the consequent additional production and
export of higher value-added products, will help the entire Chinese economy grow faster and, in
the longer run, move towards a more sophisticated production bundle, away from heavy reliance
on natural resource, labor-intensive, highly polluting manufacturing. This move towards
higher-tech, low-polluting, high value-added industries, in turn, will increase growth opportunities
for the Chinese economy, generating positive spillovers beyond those to firms directly participating
in these markets.’ Panel Reports, para. 7.514 (quoting China’s comments).
96 Id. at para. 7.386. China did not appeal the Panel’s ruling on this issue.
97 Supra n. 2.
98 GATT Art. XVIII:4(a) and (b); Sections A, C and D.
99 GATT Articles XXXVI:4 and 5.
100 See GATT Art. XVIII:14.
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focus exclusively on the improvement of market access and conditions for the
primary and processed products from these countries.101 While numerous other
WTO agreements contain provisions granting special and differential treatment to
developing countries, none of them is concerned with the use of export
restrictions as a means for economic development.
Therefore, under the existingWTO agreements, tariffs remain the only lawful
means for restricting exports for the purpose of promoting domestic industries.
Except for the several acceding Members,WTO Members are still free to claim a
larger share in the distribution of their resources through export restraints, so long
as the restraints take the form of duties, not quantitative or other non-tariff
measures. In other words, export duties have been preserved, by default under
WTO law, as the only legitimate tool to exercise a Member’s sovereign right to
freely dispose of its natural resources.
It should also be noted that although levying export duties on raw materials can
have the same economic effect as providing subsidies to domestic downstream
industries, export restraints do not fall within the meaning of a subsidy under the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMAgreement).102 Some
may consider this situation as a loophole in the system.103 At a more fundamental
level,however, it would be problematic to subject export tariffs on resource materials
to theWTO subsidy discipline,considering that export duties are the only legitimate
means available under WTO law for Members to exercise their sovereign right to
natural resources for the purpose of developing domestic industries.
3.2[d] Implications for the Several Acceding Members
By undertaking to eliminate or bind export duties at specific rates, the several
acceding Members have accepted a derogation of their sovereign right to the free
disposal of their natural resources.The degree of derogation varies depending on
the terms of accession for a particular country. In the case of China, Montenegro
and Latvia, their obligation to eliminate export duties on all, or substantially all,
products means that they have essentially forgone the right to use export restraints
for developmental purposes. For Mongolia and Saudi Arabia, the constraint is
limited to a single category of products.As forVietnam, Ukraine and Russia, their
rights to use export duties for developmental purposes are curtailed
101 GATT Art. XXXVIII:2(a).
102 See Panel Report, United States–Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R,
adopted 23 August 2001, para. 8.75.
103 See the EU proposal on export taxes, supra n. 17 (stating that ‘when used for industrial or trade
policy purposes, export taxes can serve as indirect subsidization of processing industries and influence
international trading conditions of these goods’).
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to the same extent as their export-duty bindings. Except for Russia, none of the
acceding countries have the right to revise their export concessions.104
It is, however, legally problematic not to provide the several acceding
Members with the right to modify or withdraw their export duty commitments.
As previously noted, due to the uncertainty surrounding the amendment of
accession protocols, the stand-alone commitments on export duties are de facto
permanent obligations of the acceding Members. Short of withdrawing from the
WTO, these countries have no readily available means to adjust these
commitments underWTO law. Insofar as raw materials are concerned, the lack of
a clear right on the part of a WTO Member to modify or withdraw its export
concessions is at odds with the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources.105
3.3 EXPORT DUTIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
A resource-producing country may wish to restrict the export of raw materials in
order to conserve exhaustible natural resources and reduce environmental damage
associated with their production. Both purposes are recognized as legitimate by the
WTO, which declares sustainable development and environmental protection as
part of its objectives.106 To justify an export ban or other quantitative restrictions
imposed for environmental purposes, the resource-producing country may invoke
the pertinent provisions of GATT Article XX. Over time, Article XX
jurisprudence has evolved significantly towards a more environment-friendly
position.107 In principle, it has been established that a Member has the right to
determine the level of environmental protection as it deems appropriate, provided
that the right is exercised in a non-discriminatory manner.Yet, as explained below,
the non-discrimination requirement can also get in the way of environmental
interests.And it is in this context that export duties have a positive role.
104 See Appendix 1.
105 Supra text at notes 85-87.
106 Supra n. 2.
107 The change is well summarized by a group of WTO experts as follows: ‘[I]n the GATT days,
assessment of the appropriateness of public policy exceptions were made primarily in terms of
trade considerations, with a view to ensuring that such exceptions caused as little disruption of
trade as possible.’ In contrast, nowadays ‘trade considerations are only one part of the reckoning,
with much more emphasis on the public policy aim.’ Patrick Low, Gabrielle Marceau & Julia
Reinaud, The Interface between the Trade and Climate Change Regimes: Scoping the Issue (2010), at 33,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/climate_jun10_e/background_paper3_e.pdf.
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3.3[a] Partial Conservation and Incremental Improvement
Under GATT Article XX(g), a WTO Member may adopt export restrictions for
the purpose of conserving exhaustible natural resources if the restrictions ‘are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption’. Article XX(g) has been interpreted to require that the measures in
question be ‘primarily aimed’ at the conservation and that there is
‘even-handedness’ between the restrictions imposed on domestic and foreign
producers respectively.108 A measure falling within Article XX(g) must, in
addition, satisfy the requirement of the chapeau of Article XX that it is ‘not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade’.109
As an alternative, a Member can impose export duties to achieve the same
goal, free from the constraints of Article XX. This ‘freedom’ is valuable to a
resource-producing country because it affords the country with a great deal of
flexibility in designing its environmental policies. For example, a country may wish
to reduce the consumption of a particular raw material to conserve an exhaustible
natural resource, but is also concerned with job loss in domestic industries
depending on the raw material as input.The country then may decide to impose
an export duty on the raw material without similarly taxing domestic
consumption. In this case, the measure may not be highly effective for
conservation purposes since the export duties would lower the domestic price of
the material, which in turn might stimulate domestic consumption. However, the
country can still achieve a degree of conservation as long as the increase in
domestic consumption caused by the export levy does not completely offset the
reduction in foreign consumption. Such a policy, if implemented through export
quotas, would conflict with the non-discrimination requirements of Article XX.
In essence, the ability to levy export duties allows a resource-producing
country to pursue a partial conservation policy that discriminates against foreign
users. One may view export duties as a policy tool that provides the
resource-producing country with the flexibility to protect and preserve the
environment ‘in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
108 Appellate Body Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996 (US–Gasoline), 18-19, 20-21.
109 In theory, the chapeau language can be interpreted to allow differential treatment between
countries where different conditions prevail. In practice, the Appellate Body has not focused on
the element of ‘conditions’ in its interpretation of the chapeau. For a critique of this interpretive
approach, see Julia Ya Qin, Managing Conflicts Between WTO and RTA Rulings: Reflections on the
Brazil-Tyres Case, in Pieter Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel (eds.), Making Transnational Law
Work in the Global Economy: Essays in Honor of DetlevVagts 601-29 (Cambridge U. Press 2010).
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different levels of economic development’.110 Ultimately, the resulting
discrimination against foreign users can only be justified by the permanent
sovereignty of the country over its natural resources.
3.3[b] Managing Negative Externalities
Production of raw materials is often highly polluting to the local environment.
When a resource-producing country does not have adequate environmental
standards in place, the resource products can be sold cheaply without reflecting the
true cost of production.The mispriced goods provide a commercial benefit to all
purchasers, domestic and foreign; but the negative environmental externalities may
have to be absorbed by the resource-producing country alone.When this happens,
the resource-producing country is effectively subsidizing foreign consumers at the
expense of environmental degradation at home. An export duty, set at a proper
level, can correct the mispricing and offset the potential subsidy to the importing
countries.
It is important to note that the negative environmental externalities cannot be
easily addressed by the Article XX exceptions due to their non-discrimination
requirements. As acknowledged by the WTO Report on Resource Trade, ‘the
principle of non-discrimination may constrain the ways in which aWTO Member
can impose measures designed to manage externalities’.111 Take China-Raw
Materials for example. In this case, China invoked Article XX(b) to justify its
export restrictions on a number of ‘energy-intensive, highly polluting,
resource-based products’ (hereinafter ‘EPR’ products), including coke, magnesium,
manganese and silicon carbide. China argued that its export restrictions are
necessary because environmental regulations alone cannot fully address the
environmental damage caused by EPR production. Without export restrictions,
China argued, EPR export prices would be too low with respect to the social cost
of production of EPRs, as they would not take into account the environmental
costs of such production.112
The Panel disagreed. In its view, export restrictions generally do not
internalize the social environmental costs of EPRs’ production in the domestic
economy, because export restrictions reduce the domestic prices of EPRs and
therefore stimulate, instead of reducing, further consumption of polluting EPR
products. According to the Panel, export restrictions are not an efficient policy to
address environmental externalities when such externalities derive from domestic
110 Supra n. 2.
111 WTO Report on Resource Trade, supra n. 3, at 169.
112 Panel Reports, para. 7.585.
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production rather than exports or imports. ‘This is because generally the pollution
generated by the production of the goods consumed domestically is not less than
that of the goods consumed abroad. So the issue is the production itself and not
the fact that it is traded.’113 Thus, the Panel interpreted the necessity standard of
Article XX(b) as requiring equal treatment between domestic and foreign interests
in this situation.114
The Panel’s reasoning, however, ignores an important dimension of the
situation: it may be fundamentally unfair to require China to absorb the negative
externality generated by the production of the raw materials to be consumed
abroad.When the prices do not fully reflect the environmental costs of production,
China is effectively ‘subsidizing’ all consumers with the mispriced materials.When
EPR products are sold domestically, their full environmental costs will be borne by
the Chinese society, which must live with the consequences of environmental
degradation caused by EPR production. Such costs may or may not be shared
equitably within the society, but they will have to be absorbed eventually by China
as a nation. In contrast, when EPR products are sold to foreign consumers, the
uncompensated portion of the environmental costs will also be borne by China, as
the environmental damage caused by EPR production is typically confined to the
region of production. In this situation, foreign consumers benefit from the
low-priced materials without ever having to pay for their full environmental costs.
The net effect is a ‘subsidy’ or a transfer of wealth from China to the importing
countries of EPR products.
The issue here is not whether the resource-producing country can require
foreign consumers to pay for their fair share of the environmental costs – as it
certainly can – but how. In theory, the most effective way to manage the negative
externalities should be to address the problem at the source, that is, to raise the
prices of EPR products through stricter enforcement of environmental standards
and/or high taxes on EPR production. However, in practice, it can be much more
difficult to implement production control than export control, especially in large
developing countries that lack the proper institutional capacity to enforce
production rules uniformly.115 In such situations, export duties may be the single
most effective and efficient way to compensate for negative externalities generated
by the EPR products consumed abroad.116 This policy tool, however, is no longer
available to China and other acceding Members that have given up the right to
113 Id. at para. 7.586.
114 The Panel’s finding under Art. XX(b) was not appealed.
115 See Karapinar, supra n. 17, at 1152.
116 By contrast, export quota is not an effective means for correcting the mispricing of EPR products
sold abroad, due to its indirect and uncertain relationship with the price of exports. This would be
the case whether or not the export quota is implemented in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production (i.e., in a non-discriminatory manner consistent with GATT Article XX).
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impose export duties.To comply with itsWTO obligations, China must either find
a way to raise the prices of EPR products across the board, or continue to
subsidize foreign users with mispriced EPR products. In any event, it will not be
allowed to sacrifice the environment for the benefit of its domestic industries only;
instead, the bounty of cheap EPR products must be shared equally among
domestic and foreign consumers, irrespective of how the environmental costs are
allocated.
In addition to subsidizing foreign consumers, mispricing of EPR products on
a long-term basis may induce the migration of dirty industries to the developing
countries that do not enforce proper environmental regulations.117 The shift in
production of rare earths provides such an example.The Mountain Pass Mine in
the United States used to be the world’s largest producer of rare earths, but it
closed its mining operations in 2002, amid environmental concerns and cut-rate
competition from China.118 For decades, China mined and processed rare earths
with little environmental protection, leaving vast toxic waste sites, as well as cancer
and birth defects among residents and animals.119 The lax environmental policy
combined with low-cost labour made China’s rare earths extraordinarily cheap,
driving out competition from other countries.120 As a result, China now supplies
more than 95% of the global demand, even though it has only 30% of the world’s
known reserves.121
117 See John Wilson, Tsunehiro Otsuki & Mirvat Sewadeh, Dirty Exports and Environmental Regulation:
Do Standards Matter to Trade? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2806 (Mar. 2002)
(finding that more stringent environmental standards imply less net exports of pollution intensive
industries, and that environmental legislation has a more dramatic effect on net exports in
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries than in non-OECD
countries), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=636089.
118 See Martin Zimmerman, California mine regains lust, Los Angeles Times (Oct. 14, 2009); Andrew
Restuccia, Troubled mine holds hope for US rare earths industry,Washington Independent (Oct. 25, 2010)
(available at http://washingtonindependent.com/101462/california-mine-represents-hope-and-
peril-for-u-s-rare-earth-industry).
119 See Allison Jackson (AFP), China pays price for world’s rare earths addiction (Apr. 30, 2011) (available at
www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gcxkj7mOtDf2Kv3DHxC2KFkRKy7g); Asia
Sentinel, China’s Rare Earths Mining Catastrophe, (June 21, 2011) (available at www.asiasentinel.com);
Keith Bradsher,The Fear ofToxic Rerun, N.Y.Times (June 29, 2011).
120 From 1990 to 2005, China’s rare earths exports increased nearly tenfold, and their export prices
dropped by 50%. Zhongxinwang, Rare earths sold at the price of dirt? China should insist on export control
over rare earths (July 7, 2011) (in Chinese) (available at http://edu.chinanews.com/
cj/2011/07-07/3163654.shtml).
121 Of the world’s known reserves, China has the largest share (30%), followed by the US (13%),
Australia (5%), and India (2.5%). Jane Korinek & Jeonghoi Kim, Export Restrictions on Strategic Raw
Materials and Their Impact on Trade and Global Supply, 45 J. World Trade 255, 271 (2011). For a
comprehensive report on China’s rare-earth industry and policy, see Pui-Kwan Tse,China’s Rare-Earth
Industry, U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2011–1042 (2011) (available at http://files.eesi.
org/usgs_china_030011.pdf).
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3.4 IMPACT OF WTO RULINGS IN CHINA-RAW MATERIALS: THE CASE OF RARE
EARTHS
While the dispute in China-Raw Materials was pending, a new controversy broke
out over China’s export restrictions on rare earths. The issues involved are
essentially the same as those in China-Raw Materials, but the stakes are higher
because rare earths are critical inputs to many high-tech products, including
smartphones, computers, hybrid vehicles and energy-saving lightings. China-Raw
Materials has thus become a test case for the rare earths dispute.122 The WTO
rulings, however, have met with certain responses from China that highlight the
problems discussed in the previous sections.
3.4[a] Background of the Rare Earths Controversy
As noted above, China’s exports of rare earths has increased tenfold since 1990.123
The rapid expansion in production is quickly depleting China’s rare earths
deposits.According to the Ministry of Commerce, China’s medium and heavy rare
earths may last from fifteen to twenty years at the current rate of production,
possibly requiring imports in the future.124 To conserve resources, China began to
apply export quotas on rare earths in 1998, but the quotas allocated each year were
more than sufficient to cover foreign demand.125 In July 2010, however, China
suddenly slashed the export quotas by 40%.126 Two months later, it briefly halted
shipping of rare earths to Japan over a territorial dispute.127 These events prompted
an outcry from the US, Japan and the EU, the world’s largest importers of the
minerals. In addition to quotas, China also introduced a 10% export tax on rare
earths in 2006, which has since increased to 15–25%.128 Despite their strategic
importance, rare earths are not among the eighty-four products on which China
may levy export duties in accordance with its accession protocol.129
122 See generally Gu, supra n. 5.
123 Supra n. 120.
124 Bloomberg News, China Rare Earths to Last 15-20 Years, May Import (Oct. 16, 2010) (available at
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-16/china-rare-earths-to-last-15-20-years-may-import.
html).
125 Korinek & Kim, supra n. 121,Table 13. China’s practice did not give rise to protest from importing
countries in the early years, even though the quota clearly violated GATT Art. XI and it was
questionable whether they met the conditions of the environmental exceptions under Art. XX.
126 Reuters, China cuts 2010 rare earth export quotas 40 pct-paper (Aug. 11, 2010) (available at
http://af.reuters.com/article/metalsNews/idAFTOE67A03H20100811).
127 Keith Bradsher,AmidTension, China BlocksVital Exports to Japan, N.Y.Times (Sept. 22, 2010).
128 Export tax to be raised on rare earths, People’s Daily (Dec. 15, 2010) (available at http://english.
peopledaily.com.cn).
129 Supra n. 25.
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China maintains that its export restraints on rare earths are imposed for
conservation and environmental purposes consistent with WTO rules, even
though domestic consumption has not been similarly restricted. The rulings in
China-Raw Materials have exposed the vulnerability of China’s position. On March
13, 2012, the US, Japan and the EU launched formal WTO disputes with China,
challenging its export restrictions on rare earths.130 It remains to be seen whether
China can successfully defend itself in this case.
3.4[b] Government and Public Responses
Following the release of the Panel decision in China-Raw Materials to the parties in
April 2011, China began to shift its rare-earths strategy visibly. In a new policy
document issued in May 2011, the central government laid out the basic principles
for the development of the rare-earths industry.131 While reaffirming the policy of
export restrictions, the document emphasizes the government’s resolve to control
the production of rare earths. The production control will be carried out by
various means, including cracking down illegal mining, enforcing environmental
regulation and raising resource taxes, but above all, it will be carried out by
mandatory State planning and consolidation of the industry.132 The government
will compel mergers and acquisitions of small and medium-sized producers,
typically private companies, and let a few large state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
dominate the field.133
Thus, in anticipation of a new WTO challenge, China has decided to place
the rare-earths industry under a firmer State control.The large SOEs will be able
to set prices and choose to sell their products to domestic producers rather than
export. Although China’s accession protocol requires the Chinese government to
ensure that all its SOEs will ‘make purchases and sales based solely on commercial
considerations’ and that otherWTO Members will ‘have an adequate opportunity
to compete for sales to and purchases from these enterprises on
non-discriminatory terms and conditions’,134 it will be very difficult to monitor
SOE activities given the lack of transparency in their operations.
130 Supra n. 4.
131 State Council, Several Opinions on the Promotion of Sustaining and Healthy Development of the Rare Earths
Industry, Guofa [2011], No. 12,May 10, 2011.
132 At present, there are more than 300 rare-earth producers; and the goal is to reduce that number
to around 20. See Tse, supra n. 121.
133 China permits Sino-foreign joint ventures to engage in the production and export of rare earths.
It appears there are a dozen or so such joint ventures. Tse, supra n. 121.
134 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3 (Nov. 10, 2001), para.
46, which paragraph was incorporated into China’s Accession Protocol.
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Since the release of the Appellate Body’s report, China has expressed its strong
disagreement with the WTO ruling.135 Meanwhile, the Chinese press has
indicated that the government will obey the ruling but will find other ‘non-tariff
and non-quota’ ways to avoidWTO constraints.136
The rare-earths controversy and theWTO ruling in China-Raw Materials have
been widely reported in China.The case has aroused strong nationalistic feelings,
and public opinion overwhelmingly supports the export restrictions.137 In the
view of many, China must ‘fight the battle’ to protect its strategic resources from
the grab of Western powers.138 ‘Free trade’ may not override the fundamental
rights of a nation.139 And ‘the rest of the world has to realize that China cannot go
on sacrificing its environment for the benefit of other countries’.140 The WTO
ruling is therefore perceived as unfair, exposing the WTO as an organization
lacking an understanding of the problems of developing countries.141
In this context, it was also reported in the Chinese media that while suing
China for export restrictions on raw materials, the EU and the US have been
simultaneously levying anti-dumping duties on some of the very materials
involved in their WTO complaints.142 The incoherence in the EU and US trade
policies provides further evidence for the belief that the WTO complaints against
China’s export restrictions are unjustified.143
135 See BNAWTO Reporter, U.S., EU and Mexico Urge China to Lift Export Restrictions inWake ofWTO
Ruling, 23 February 2012 (reporting that China told the Dispute Settlement Body that the Appellate
Body and Panel rulings are improper and will risk creating an unsustainable two-tiered system where
new Members do not have the same right to promote fundamental societal interests as established
Members).
136 See Zhongcaiwang, WTO Claims ‘Victory’, China’s Battle to Defend Rare Earths Is Ready to Be Set Off,
Feb. 4, 2012 (in Chinese), at http://www.cfi.net.cn/p20120204000308.html.
137 In an online poll conducted soon after the case of China-Raw Materials was filed at the WTO,
nearly 90% of the people responded support China’s restriction on the export of strategic resources.
Huanqiuwang, Nearly 90% of Netizens Vote in Favor of China’s Restrictions on the Export of Strategic
Materials, June 14, 2009 (in Chinese), at http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2009-06/487700.html.
138 See e.g., WANG Junzhi, China’s Battle to Defend Rare Earths, (China Economics Press 2011) (in
Chinese); Hexun, China sets off the battle to defend rare earths (in Chinese) (available at
http://news.hexun.com/2010/xitu/index.html).
139 Xinhua.net, China’s export restriction on rare earths is consistent withWTO rules (May 21, 2011) (available
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-05/21/c_121441790.htm).
140 Mei Xinyu, WTO Ruling Not End of Road for China, China Daily (July 20, 2011) (available at
www.chinadaily.com.cn).
141 There is also a call for China to fight for the revision of ‘the unequal clause’ in its accession
protocol. Id.
142 See Xinhua, A regrettable WTO ruling (July 6, 2011) (available at http://news.xinhuanet.com). Since
2008, the EU has imposed an anti-dumping duty of 25.8% on certain coke imported from China.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 239/2008 of 17 March 2008. The US currently maintains
anti-dumping duties on magnesium, coke and silicon metal from China. Source: USITA,
http://web.ita.doc.gov. See also Daniel Ikenson, Economic Self-Flagellation: How US Antidumping Policy
Subverts the National Export Initiative, Cato InstituteTrade Policy Analysis no. 46 (May 31, 2011).
143 See e.g., Ye Tan, China’s export restriction on rare earths is justified and reasonable (July 8, 2011) (in
Chinese) (available at http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/articles/20110708/xitu-chukou.htm).
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In sum, while the WTO decision may prompt China to tighten
environmental regulations across the board, it has also met with two responses that
are undesirable from a systemic perspective of the WTO. First, the move to
increase the State control in the resource sector goes in the opposite direction
from the market-oriented economic reform that WTO accession is supposed to
promote. The result may give rise to more serious conflicts between China and
other Members, as the issues of SOEs are among the hardest to address under
WTO law. Second, the WTO ruling has triggered nationalistic reactions from the
Chinese.The negative image ensuing from the WTO ruling may well undermine
public support for initiatives to liberalize trade in the future.
China’s predicament, of course, stems from its sweeping accession
commitments on export duties – most otherWTO Members will not be similarly
constrained.144 But its ultimate disadvantage lies in the lack of any realistic chance
to adjust such commitments. If its export duty commitments could be modified in
a manner similar to its import duty commitments, China would have some policy
space to adjust the level of its resource exports. In that event, the government
might not be compelled to resort to non-market means to avoidWTO constraints,
and the public might not be so concerned since the stake would not be as high.
4 THE ROAD TO REFORM
The China case highlights one side of the problem in the existing WTO export
duty regime: the stand-alone obligations imposed on the selected acceding
Members are so rigid that they may backfire. The other side of the problem, of
course, is the complete lack of obligation to limit the use of export duties on the
part of mostWTO Members.The system is badly in need of reform.
4.1 ESTABLISHING A SYSTEM-WIDE DISCIPLINE ON EXPORT DUTIES
4.1[a] Reaffirm the Need for Regulating the Use of Export Duties
The world trade system has long recognized that export duties ‘often constitute
serious obstacles to trade’ and that negotiations should be directed to ‘the
substantial reduction of the general level of tariffs and other changes on imports
and exports’.145 Today, the need for a system-wide discipline on export duties is
144 This fact, however, has rarely been mentioned in the public discourse in China. Apart from the
difficulty in explaining the technical details of WTO rules, the government may not be keen on
publicizing the WTO-plus obligations it has undertaken.
145 GATT Art. XXVIII bis, para. 1. The provision was added to the General Agreement during the
review session of 1954-55. See GATTAnalytical Index,Art. XXVIII bis.
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greater than ever. With the emergence of global supply chains and rapid
industrialization in the developing world, many economies have become
dependent on the import of raw materials and intermediate goods.146 Yet, in the
meantime, the use of export tariffs has proliferated, especially on resource products.
According to WTO statistics, 11% of world trade in natural resources, and 5% of
total world trade, is now covered by export taxes.147 More than thirty countries
are among the main users of export taxes in natural resources, all of which are
developing nations.148 The trend is expected to continue, as the global demand for
resource products continues to outpace their supply, and the development of
alternative resources takes time.
Unconstrained use of export duties creates uncertainty and unpredictability in
global trade. More seriously, export restraints increase tension in international
relations and can provoke retaliation. In some countries, the mounting pressure for
access to raw materials has already turned resource trade into a matter of ‘high
politics’ of national security.149 The increasing use of export restrictions on
agricultural products has also raised the grave concern for food security in recent
years.150 The lack of an effective WTO discipline on export restraints, therefore,
may develop into a risk of political instability in the world.
In short, it is time for theWTO to reaffirm the need for regulating the levy of
export duties. Having an effective WTO discipline on export restraints should
benefit developed and developing countries alike.Many developing nations are not
resource-rich, and very few are endowed with all the natural resources necessary
for economic advancement.A system-wide discipline can provide a high degree of
security and transparency in the access to the world’s resources for all.
146 For example, about 70% of all imports to the EU in 2007 were intermediate goods headed for
transformation there. Peter Mandelson, Speech, The Challenge of Raw Materials (Trade and Raw
Materials Conference, Brussels, Sept. 29, 2008) (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=SPEECH/08/467&type=HTML).
147 WTO Report on Resource Trade, supra n. 3, at 116-117.
148 Id. Figure 30, at 119.The figure does not include Russia, which was not aWTO Member at the time,
but a major exporter of natural resources and a heavy user of export taxes. See Mandelson, supra n. 146
(noting that when Russia imposed an export duty of 50% on scrap aluminum, which ‘has all but
wiped out trade in this metal’).
149 Mikkal Herberg, Introduction to NBR Special Report No. 31, Asia’s Rising Energy and Resource
Nationalism: Implications for the United States, China and Asia-Pacific Region 3 (2011).
150 A survey by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the UN found that twenty-five
developing countries imposed a ban or increased taxes on the export of agricultural products in
recent years. Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses, Policy Report jointly
issued by FAO, IFAD, IMF,OECD, UNCTAD,WFP, the World Bank, the WTO, IFPRI and the UN
HLTF (June 2, 2011), para. 37.Available at http://www.ifad.org/operations/food/documents/g20.pdf.
See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Fashioning a New Regime for Agricultural Trade: New Issues and Global
Food Crisis, 14 J. Int’l Econ. Law 593 (2011).
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4.1[b] Regulate Export Duties in the SameWay as ImportTariffs,Taking into Account their
Legitimate Functions
To garner the support of major developing country Members, the new WTO
discipline needs to acknowledge the legitimate functions of export duties.
However, the major proposals tabled within the WTO to date have generally
opposed the use of export duties for industrial policy or trade purposes.151 This
stance has been carried to an extreme by theWTO ruling in China-Raw Materials,
which effectively prohibits several acceding Members from using export duties for
any purpose.
Thus, at least in the context of accession, the WTO has chosen to regulate
export duties more strictly than import duties. With respect to import duties,
WTO law continues to recognize them as a legitimate means of protecting
domestic industries. Even after eight rounds of tariff negotiations, most WTO
Members still maintain extensive uses of import duties, albeit the average rates of
duty have decreased significantly. All import tariff bindings are entitled to public
policy exceptions and may be modified or withdrawn on a regular basis.
Moreover, developing countries are given extra flexibility in the use of import
duties and are not required to make concessions inconsistent with their
‘development, financial and trade needs’.152 In contrast, the WTO has required
selected acceding countries, all of which are developing economies, to abolish
export duties altogether or to eliminate export duties on numerous products.Their
export duty concessions are fixed as stand-alone obligations, without the benefit of
policy exceptions (unless specifically provided otherwise in the accession protocol)
or a realistic chance for adjustment.
Is this harsher treatment of export duties warranted, however? From an
economic standpoint, export duties do not produce greater trade-distorting effects
or welfare loss than import tariffs.153 It is true that due to uneven geographical
distribution of natural resources, a small number of countries may control the
world’s supply of a particular material; consequently, when a major supplier
151 See Communication from the European Communities, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products:
Negotiating Proposal on Export Taxes,TN/MA/W/11/Add.6 (Apr. 27, 2006) (proposing the elimination
of export duties by all Members); and the revised EU proposal on export taxes, supra n. 17 (proposing
a less strict approach than the 2006 proposal).
152 Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (The
Enabling Clause), GATT Doc. L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), BISD 26S/203 (1980), para. 5.
153 The sum of welfare loss generated by export duties should be the same as that generated by
import tariffs, albeit the distributional effects of the two may differ. Notably, in the case of export
duties, consumer loss may spread across multiple countries, whereas in the case of import tariffs
consumer loss concentrates in the single importing country. For a detailed study on the economic
implications of export taxes, see Roberta Piermartini, The Role of Export Taxes in the Field of Primary
Commodities (WTO Publications 2004) (available at https://www.wto.org/english/res
_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers4_e.pdf).
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country levies a heavy duty or suddenly changes its levy on the export of a
resource material, it may cause special difficulties for all the importing countries
relying on its supply. This problem, however, concerns the level and the
predictability of export duties, rather than the use of export duties per se, and it
can be adequately addressed by the binding of duties and by the strengthening of
transparency requirements on export levies.154 In this context, it is also relevant to
note that as the owner of its natural wealth, the resource–producing country may
rightfully seek ‘rents’ from the sale of its resources to other countries.155 In
contrast to rents in manufactures or services, which can be bid away by expanding
production elsewhere, the rents on depleting natural assets are intrinsic to the
scarcity of global natural resources.156 Such rents therefore properly belong to the
country in which the resource endowment is located.
As discussed in detail above, export duties have a number of distinct functions
that should be recognized as legitimate.157 In light of these functions of export
duties, especially their utilities for developing countries,WTO disciplines should not
treat export duties more harshly than import duties. Instead of requiring their
elimination, the WTO should acknowledge the legitimate uses of export duties,
aiming to strike a balance between the interests of importing countries and
exporting countries through tariff bindings. The negotiation and regulation of
export tariff bindings may follow the same GATT norms governing import tariff
bindings, taking into account the special features of resource trade. In short, export
duties can and should be regulated in the same way as import duties underWTO law.
4.2 BRINGING ALL STAND-ALONE EXPORT CONCESSIONS INTO GATT
As previously analysed, the stand-alone export duty obligations of the acceding
Members are problematic for both legal and policy reasons. From a legal
viewpoint, the lack of right to modify or withdraw export duty commitments is at
odds with the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources under
international law.The unavailability of public policy exceptions to the export duty
commitments cannot be explained by anyWTO principles.Within the system, the
stand-alone obligations create multiple tiers of Members, causing fragmentation of
WTO law. As can be observed in the case of China, the rigid stand-alone
obligations may backfire – causing the country to resort to less transparent means
to achieve the same goal.
154 See the EU proposal on export taxes, supra n. 17.
155 Resource deposits typically carry rents, as the value of output well exceeds the cost of production.
Paul Collier & Anthony J. Venables, International Rules for Trade in Natural Resources (WTO Staff
Working Paper ERSD-2010-06, Jan. 2010) (available at www.wto.org).
156 Id.
157 See Section 3.
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The stand-alone obligations are contractually agreed between the WTO and
the individual acceding countries.The fact that the obligations have been accepted
by the acceding Member, however, does not justify maintaining such a seriously
flawed arrangement.158 Instead, the WTO should acknowledge that the
arrangement is flawed and be prepared to rectify the situation.
4.2[a] Create ‘PartV’ of GATT Schedules for the Acceding Members
A principled solution to the problem of stand-alone export duty commitments is
to bring all of them into the GATT framework. At present, each WTO Member
has a ‘Schedule of Concessions and Commitments’ annexed to the GATT.159 Each
GATT Schedule consists of four parts: Part I lists MFN concessions, Part II
preferential concessions, Part III concessions on non-tariff measures and Part IV
the specific commitments made during the Uruguay Round on domestic support
and export subsidies on agricultural products.160 In the case of Russia, as noted
above, a new Part V has been created to list its extensive concessions on export
duties.161
Following the Russian example, a ‘Part V’ could be added to the GATT
schedules of the acceding Members to record their export duty commitments set
out in the accession protocols. It would be straightforward to record all the
bindings at specific rates, as in the case of Vietnam, Ukraine, Latvia (specific
antiques) and China (eighty-four products).162 For the commitments to eliminate
export duties, a conversion to 0% would be required.This would not be hard in
the case of Mongolia, Saudi Arabia and Latvia, as their commitments to eliminate
duties concern a small number of products only. As for China and Montenegro,
whose commitments to eliminate export duties are across the board, the recording
might be done by reference to the relevant provisions of the accession protocol.
Thus, Part V of the GATT Schedule for China could simply provide as follows:
‘See the commitments in paragraph 11.3 and Annex 6 of the Accession
Protocol.’163
Procedurally, there is a question concerning the proper mechanism for
incorporating ‘PartV’ under the GATT schedules of the acceding Members. Since
158 See supra text at n. 46 regarding the political reality of accession negotiations.
159 The schedule is binding on the Member by virtue of GATT Art. II:7, which states: ‘The
Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this
Agreement.’
160 Hoda, supra n. 53, at 19.
161 See Section 2.2[d].
162 See Appendix 1.
163 This technique has already been used in Part IV of China’s GATT Schedule, which incorporates
China’s commitments on agricultural subsidies by reference to ‘related commitments in the
Working Party Report’. See GATT Schedule CLII, People’s Republic of China.
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the accession protocols do not provide for the incorporation of export duty
commitments into the GATT schedules, it can be argued that such a move would
require an amendment to the accession protocols. If this view prevails, there would
be serious doubts regarding the feasibility of the incorporation, given the legal
uncertainty surrounding the revision of accession protocols.164
It is important to note, however, that adding Part V to a GATT schedule is a
matter of amending the GATT schedule, which is legally distinct from amending
the accession protocol. Technically, any amendment to a GATT schedule shall
require the unanimous consent of all WTO Members, since the schedule
constitutes an integral part of GATT Article II.165 Yet, an early GATT decision has
clarified that the rates of duty contained in the schedules were meant to be
maximum rates only; therefore, a reduction in the rate of duty on a product below
the rate set forth in a schedule would not require unanimous consent.166 In
practice, Members have relied on internal GATT procedures to record unilateral,
bilateral and plurilateral concessions.167 Thus, should India declare that it would
make a unilateral commitment to bind its export duties on ten mineral products at
20%, the WTO would be able to accommodate this trade-liberalizing move by
recording the commitment in India’s GATT Schedule (possibly by adding Part V
to it). Since India’s export duties are currently ‘unbound’, the new concessions
would be considered a modification of its current GATT schedule. By the same
token, insofar as the existing GATT schedules are concerned, the export duty
commitments of the acceding Members would all be new concessions and
therefore could be accommodated in the same fashion.168
The substantive issue here, of course, is whether the incorporation of the
export duty commitments into the GATT schedules will prejudice the interests of
other WTO Members. The incorporation would not change the scope of the
existing export duty commitments.What would be changed is the rigidity of the
commitments. As already explained, the lack of rights on the part of the acceding
countries to invoke GATT policy exceptions and to adjust their commitments is
problematic as a matter of fundamentalWTO principles and may be challenged as
inconsistent with the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
The very purpose of incorporating the export duty commitments into the GATT
is to cure this defect.
164 See Section 2.2[c][ii].
165 See GATT Art. XXX; Art. X:2 of the WTO Agreement.
166 GATT Analytical Index, Art. II, 101 (quoting the GATT decision on 9 August 1949, BISD Vol.
II/11).
167 Hoda, supra n. 53, at 117 (citing the 1980 GATT decision on Procedures for Modification and Rectification
of Schedules ofTariff Concessions (L/4962)).
168 The recording of these new concessions should be made only after approval by a WTO decision
as explained below.
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Considering that the incorporation would have practical implications for the
terms of accession, it is recommended that a decision to approve the incorporation
be taken by the WTO General Council following the same procedures for
approving the terms of accession. In WTO practice, the decision to approve
accession terms is taken under the Decision-Making Procedures Under Articles IX
and XII of the WTO Agreement.169 Pursuant to these Procedures, when dealing
with matters ‘related to accessions’, the General Council will seek a decision by
consensus in accordance with Article IX:1 of the WTO Agreement; where a
decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter will be decided by a
two-thirds majority vote of all Members in accordance with Article XII:2 of the
WTO Agreement. This process would afford WTO Members an opportunity to
focus on the issues raised by export tariffs and to clarify their common intentions
behind those accession commitments. Once the General Council adopts the
decision, the export duty commitments of the acceding Member can be recorded
in its GATT schedule as new concessions that modify its existing schedule.
In connection with the approval process, it would be desirable for the General
Council to confirm that GATT Article XXVIII (Modification of Schedules) can
be applied to PartV of the GATT schedules.170
4.2[b] China ShouldTake the Lead in Reform
To initiate the process, the several acceding Members need to make the request for
incorporating their export concessions into the GATT schedules. China, being the
first to face the legal consequences of such stand-alone commitments, should have
the incentive to take the lead. The incorporation would give China the right to
invoke GATT policy exceptions to justify departures from its export duty
commitments. More importantly, in the long run, it would give China the right to
renegotiate its scheduled concessions.171 The chance to renegotiate such
concessions in the future would provide China with the policy space desired to
169 Adopted by the General Council on 15 November 1995,WT/L/93, 24 November 1995.
170 See supra text at notes 60-66. Under Art. IX:2 of theWTO Agreement, the General Council has the
‘exclusive authority to adopt interpretations’ of the WTO agreements. This power has never been
exercised in practice. To confirm the applicability of Art. XXVIII to Part V of the GATT schedule
would not require the General Council to exercise this authority if it does not amount to an
interpretation of Art. XXVIII.
171 On the applicability of Art. XXVIII, see supra text at notes 60-66. Pursuant to Art. XXVIII, China
would be expected to make compensatory adjustments in the renegotiation so as to maintain a general
level of concessions no less favorable to trade than the status quo ante.The compensatory adjustment
for the modification of a particular export duty commitment might take various forms, such as
reductions in import duties on specific products, or commitments to cut domestic subsidies in specific
sectors. If no agreement can be reached, the Members ‘primarily concerned’ and with ‘a substantial
interest’ would be free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions.The result of the Art. XXVIII
process would be applied to all otherWTO Members on an MFN basis. See supra text at notes 51-53.
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address some of the systemic issues arising from China-Raw Materials and the
rare-earths dispute.172
Bringing the stand-alone commitments into the GATT framework would be
an important step towards the goal of establishing a system-wide discipline on
export duties. The rigid obligations imposed on the selected acceding Members
reflect a strong bias against the use of export duties as a tool for economic
development. Their existence, therefore, cannot but discourage other developing
country Members from joining the effort to curb export restraints. For foreign
policy reasons, China has supported other developing countries in their resistance
to the call for a system-wide discipline, despite the fact that its economy is heavily
dependent on the import of resource materials.173 This policy, however, is
short-sighted. As discussed above, the broad and long-term interest of the
developing countries lies in a system-wide discipline that strikes a proper balance
between the need of the importing countries to secure access to resources and the
need of the exporting countries to preserve the legitimate functions of export
duties. If China desires to play a greater role in WTO rule-making, it should
consider taking the lead in the reform of the current irrational system on export
restraints.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The current WTO regime on export restraints is irrational and badly in need of
reform. The absence of a general discipline on the use of export duties leaves
global production chains vulnerable to instability and unpredictability in the
supply of resource materials.And the lack of security in access to critical resources
creates tension and can provoke retaliation in international relations.Yet, proposals
to strictly limit the use of export duties have met continued resistance from
developing country Members. Unable to effect a systematic change, theWTO has
172 Both the EU and the US have resorted to the modification of schedules to resolve the underlying
issues in WTO disputes after they lost in the disputes. In EC-Chicken Cuts (DS269, DS286), the
EU, after initially complying with the WTO rulings, launched negotiations with Brazil and Thailand
under GATT Art. XXVIII, seeking to change the tariff rates mandated by the WTO rulings. See
Goliath Business News, EU/Brazil/Thailand: EU Preparing to Introduce Quotas on Chicken Cuts (Sept.
29, 2006), available at http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-7433324/EU-BRAZIL
-THAILAND-EU-PREPARING.html. In US-Gambling (DS285), the US never complied with the
WTO ruling; instead, it modified its scheduled commitment at issue through negotiations with several
Members pursuant to GATS Article XXI. See USTR, Statement on Internet Gambling (Dec. 21, 2007)
(available at www.ustr.org).
173 China is one of the largest importers of resources in the world. See supra n. 15. To secure access to
resources, China has been pursuing the strategy of foreign direct investment in resource-producing
countries. For statistics, see Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian,A China Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper Series, WP 11-22, Dec.
2011),Table 5 and Figure 5.
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nonetheless required a few acceding countries to make sweeping export-duty
commitments. Such commitments are fixed as stand-alone obligations outside the
GATT framework, thus depriving the acceding Members of the policy space and
flexibility afforded by the GATT provisions.These country-specific rules have also
resulted in incoherence in WTO law and have created multiple tiers of Members
with unequal rights and obligations within theWTO system.
It is submitted here that the key to beginning reform of the current regime
lies in the recognition of the legitimate functions of export duties. The lack of
such recognition at the systemic level is the fundamental reason why ultra-rigid
obligations on export duties have been imposed on the several acceding Members.
It also explains why calls for a system-wide discipline on export duties have failed
to garner wide support from developing country Members. Only when the
legitimate roles of export duties are duly acknowledged can the developing
countries be expected to take an interest in negotiating a general export-duty
discipline.
Most critically, it is necessary for theWTO to acknowledge the role of export
duties in promoting the economic development of resource-producing countries.
The levy of export duties allows a resource-producing country to claim a larger
share in the distribution of its natural resources for domestic use. History has
shown that reserving scarce resources for use by domestic producers is an effective
means for developing economies to climb up the value chain. Despite criticism
that such a policy has a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ effect, it is nonetheless justifiable by
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Unlike other
sovereign prerogatives, the sovereign right over natural resources, which includes
the right to dispose of such resources freely for developmental purposes, has been
recognized as a basic human right under international law. Although the exercise
of such right is without prejudice to the treaty obligations a nation undertakes of
its own free will, theWTO should take care to respect this fundamental principle
of international law in the design of its trade disciplines. Since the GATT already
prohibits the use of non-tariff measures to restrict exports for developmental
purposes, the only legitimate means a WTO Member may employ to claim a
larger share in the distribution of its natural resources is through export duties.
Thus, when theWTO obligates a Member to eliminate export duties on resource
products, as it has done with several acceding Members, it strips away the right of
that Member to dispose freely of its natural resources for developmental purposes.
When such obligations are made virtually immutable, as is the case with the several
acceding Members, it amounts to permanent alienation of a Member’s ownership
right to claim a larger share of its natural resources for domestic use. Such an
arrangement is arguably inconsistent with the concept of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources.
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It is also important for theWTO to acknowledge the role of export duties in
managing environmental externalities. When the prices of resource products do
not fully reflect their environmental costs, the resource-producing country is
effectively ‘subsidizing’ the importing countries with mispriced resources at the
expense of its own environment. In such a situation, export duties set at a proper
level can offset negative externalities generated by the production of the resource
products sold abroad. As shown in the case of China, when a Member loses the
right to impose export duties, it is required, under the non-discrimination
requirements of WTO law, to share the bounty of its mispriced resource products
with all foreign users, even though their environmental costs are not similarly
shared. While, in theory, the most efficient way to manage such environmental
externalities is to fix the regulation of the production process, for those developing
countries that lack the necessary institutional capacities (poor governance) to deal
with the problem at the source, taxing exports at the border remains a most
practical and effective means to address the problem.
In the light of legitimate functions of export duties and their special utility for
developing countries, it should become clear that the rigid obligations imposed on
the acceding Members to eliminate export duties on resource products are
problematic as a matter of WTO law and policy. Rather than treating export
duties as more objectionable trade barriers than import duties and pushing for
their elimination, the world trade system should aim to create export tariff
bindings at levels appropriate for individual Members, with the goal of striking a
proper balance between the need of WTO Members to have a secure and
predictable access to the world’s resources, and the need of the resource-producing
countries to control exports as a means of achieving sustainable economic
development.
In the view of this author, fortunately, there exists a relatively simple, yet
effective, way for the WTO to rectify this problematic state of affairs. That is, to
incorporate all stand-alone commitments of the acceding Members on export
duties into their respective GATT schedules. The Russia accession has already
created the first-ever GATT schedule on export concessions. China and other
acceding Members should follow the Russian precedent and request that their
export duty commitments be similarly incorporated into their GATT schedules.
The integration of the accession commitments into the GATT framework would
provide the acceding Members with the policy space and flexibility available under
the existing GATT provisions, thereby correcting part of the institutional bias and
ensuring a greater degree of coherence and consistency within the WTO system.
This integration would not change the content and scope of the export duty
commitments, and therefore would not disturb the balance of rights and
obligations negotiated under the accession protocols. Due to the separate legal
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existence of GATT schedules, such integration would not raise the issue of
amendment to the accession protocols, which remains surrounded by legal
uncertainty.The creation of several new GATT schedules on export duties would
regularize the practice for recording export duty commitments, which could help
set the stage for future negotiations on the binding of export tariffs on a
system-wide basis.
In sum, the world needs a sensible discipline on export restraints that can
ensure secure and predictable access to resource products for all, while respecting
the right of sovereign nations to reserve a larger share of their natural resources for
the benefit of domestic industries, and the need of developing countries to use
export duties for other legitimate purposes, such as managing environmental
externalities. The world trade system can provide such a discipline by regulating
export duties in the same way as it has regulated import duties for the past six
decades. That is, to establish the binding of export duties according to the same
principles and rules as those applied to import tariffs. The rigid obligations
imposed on selected acceding Members do not conform to those norms. Bringing
those obligations into the GATT framework would be a first step in the reform of
theWTO discipline on export restraints.
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Appendix 1 Status of Export Duty Obligations of WTO Members
WTO
Member
(Year of
Accession)
Obligation
to
Eliminate
Export
Duties
Obligation to
Bind Export
Duties at
Specific Rates
(including
0%)
Availability
of GATT
Policy
Exceptions
Adjustability
of Export
Duty
Obligations
1st
Tier
140+
Members
No No n/a n/a
2nd
Tier
Australia1 Yes (on a
dozen types
of minerals)
No Yes (GATT
schedule)
Yes
Russia
(2012)2
No Yes (over 700
tariff lines)
Yes (GATT
schedule)
Yes
3rd
Tier
Vietnam
(2007)3
No Yes (8
products)
Yes (specific
reference to
GATT)
No
Ukraine
(2008)4
No Yes (over 70
types of
products)
Yes (specific
reference to
GATT
exceptions)
No
4th
Tier
Mongolia
(1997)5
Yes (on raw
cashmere)
No No No
Latvia
(1999)6
Yes (on over
50 products)
Yes (specific
antiques)
No No
China
(2001)7
Yes (on all
except 84
products)
Yes (84
products)
No No
Saudi
Arabia
(2005)8
Yes (on iron
and steel
scrap)
No No No
Montenegro
(2012)9
Yes (on all
products)
No No No
1 Australia’s Uruguay Round Goods Schedules, AUS1-201 through AUS1-204 (available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/australia_e.htm).
2 The Working Party Report on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade
Organization,WT/ACC/RUS/70 (Nov. 17, 2011), para. 638; GATT Schedule CLXV, The Russian
Federation, Part V–Export Duties,WT/ACC/RUS/70/ADD.1 (Nov. 17, 2011).
3 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam,WT/ACC/VNM/48 (Oct. 27, 2006),
para. 260 and Table 17.
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4 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine to the World Trade Organization,
WT/ACC/UKR/152 (Jan. 25, 2008), para. 240 and Table 20(b).
5 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Mongolia, WT/ACC/MGN/9 (June 27, 1996),
para. 24.
6 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Latvia to the World Trade Organization,
WT/ACC/LVA/32 (Sept. 30, 1998), para. 69; Annex 3.
7 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001), para.
11.3; Annex 6.
8 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the World
Trade Organization,WT/ACC/SAU/61 (Nov. 1, 2005), para. 184.
9 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization,
WT/ACC/CGR/38 (Dec. 5, 2011), para. 132.
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